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1. Introduction 
In spite of the recent cyclical downturn, there is a growing sense that the United States has 
been steaming ahead again in terms of economic development compared to most OECD 
countries but especially compared to Germany and Japan, which not long ago, namely in the 
1980s, were considered to be successful economic role models. The catch-up process of these 
two countries vis-à-vis the US does not only seem to be have stopped, but the gap appears to 
have begun to widen again. This is largely the result of a poor economic performance in the 
1990s, especially in Japan, but also in reunified Germany with considerably lower growth 
rates of per capita GDP and of total factor productivity and a far less impressive labour 
market performance featuring lower and at times even negative employment growth and 
rising instead of falling NAIRUs. The US appears to be better able to cope with the economic 
challenges posed to OECD countries in recent years which can be traced back inter alia to 
globalisation and to labour-saving technical progress.  
The prime challenge to advanced economies is presented by the radical and rapid process of 
structural change, that is, the ongoing move from largely standardised products of the 
industrial sector to the service sector, but also to the fledgling areas of the new economy, such 
as biotechnology, information and internet technology, computers or the media. This 
structural change is also reflected in a changing composition of labour demand, with the 
demand for highly qualified and versatile labour rising relative to the demand for low-skilled 
workers who can perform relatively few tasks. A second important challenge is due to the 
greater volatility and microeconomic turbulence of the economic environment that favours 
countries with a more flexible set of institutions in order to be able to respond quickly to 
shocks and to new economic opportunities. All this conveys the impression that this may be 
the dawn of a new era of creative destruction with greater risks, but also potentially greater 
returns for innovative entrepreneurs, since the viability of firms increasingly depends on 
innovative rather than on imitative activities. Countries with a rigid set of institutions that 
tend to stifle innovative entrepreneurship are therefore likely to fall behind in terms of 
economic development as reflected in growth of GDP per capita and of employment.
1  
A third and by now well-known challenge for Japan is solving the ongoing banking crisis. 
Interestingly, indicators are mounting nowadays that Germany may have also stumbled into a 
major banking crisis in 2003 with record rates of bankruptcies of firms and of banks having to 
write off large amounts of bad loans. Back in the 1980s, both countries were heralded for their 
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bank-based financial markets which had the same legal roots in the German law tradition
2 and 
which supposedly gave them an institutional advantage due to stronger protection of creditor 
rights, more patient financial markets, potentially larger investment volumes and closer 
relationships between banks and large industrial companies for example. All these factors 
allegedly enable experienced managers to pursue a longer time horizon in their more 
discretionary and more large-scale investment policy supposedly to the long-term benefit not 
only of the firm’s share- and stakeholders but also for the country concerned. 
Such a positive assessment of bank-based financial markets in countries that are not at the 
frontier of economic development was actually not restricted to the 1980s, but was already 
emphasised by Gerschenkron (1962) in his well-known volume Economic Backwardness in 
Historical Perspective. The key notion here is the following: Bank-based financial markets 
are insider-oriented systems which value the experience of managers more than stock-market-
based financial markets do and provide greater protection from short-run market pressures. 
Furthermore, experienced managers can realise greater investment volumes and are better at 
adopting already-existing technologies in large quantities. Finally, these two factors are the 
more important for the economic progress of a country, the further away it is from the world 
frontier of economic development and were therefore potentially beneficial for Germany and 
Japan in the post-war period.  
In contrast, when approaching the frontier it becomes more important for a country to 
innovate itself and thus to select the right managers and firms for undertaking promising 
innovations and new ventures as well as to have a smooth matching process between firms 
and financiers. Anglo-Saxon type stock-market-based financial markets with fully developed 
venture capital markets tend to be superior in these types of selection and matching activities, 
inter alia because they give less shelter to entrenched managers who might not be innovative 
anymore, thus being more open to the entry of outsider entrepreneurs with new ideas. 
Concerning the optimal institutional setting in financial markets for long-run growth of per 
capita GDP and of employment, this suggests that there may be a trade-off between 
experience on the one hand and selection as well as matching on the other hand. The optimal 
position might depend on the economic environment as well as on the distance of a specific 
country to the frontier of economic development. More turbulent times with rapid and radical 
structural change, along with a closer position to the frontier of economic development both 
appear to favour the Anglo-Saxon-type institutional setting in financial markets with highly 
developed venture capital markets.
3 
The poor performance of Germany, particularly in terms of rising unemployment is usually 
blamed on its rigid labour market and its generous welfare state.
4 However, it might in 
addition be the case for both, Germany and Japan, that the insider-oriented bank-based 
institutional setting of their financial markets is no longer an asset but rather a burden for 
realising further economic progress and for improving labour market performance. The 
comparative institutional advantage concerning financial markets might have shifted over the 
last decade not only to the US but to Anglo-Saxon countries in general, which feature stock-
market based financial markets with a stronger protection of shareholder rights and more 
developed venture capital markets.
5 It is noteworthy in this respect that not only the US but 
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also other Anglo-Saxon countries even within Europe, such as the UK and Ireland, have fared 
particularly well in the 1990s and into the new millennium in terms of growth of per capita 
GDP and of employment. They have both recently surpassed Germany in terms of their per 
capita GDP and have had a much better labour market performance. A secular deterioration in 
relative economic performance of the former champions Germany and Japan seems to have 
occurred that might at least be partially related to their peculiar bank-based insider-oriented 
institutional setting on financial markets which is not conducive to developing fully-fledged 
venture capital markets.   
Anglo-Saxon financial markets are characterised by highly developed stock markets and 
markets for initial public offerings, which are in turn essential for flourishing venture capital 
markets. Venture capital has in recent years played a key role especially in Anglo-Saxon 
countries in financing structural change, innovations and new firms. These factors are again 
essential for understanding employment performances over the last decade. Venture capital is 
a hybrid system between arm’s length and relationship-based financing with venture 
capitalists not only mitigating financing constraints but potentially adding value via their 
sector-specific business knowledge. Due to their experience and expertise, they can increase 
the survival rate of young firms in the particularly treacherous seed and start-up phase of a 
new firm’s economic life cycle. Hence, venture capitalists are not just financiers but they 
perform important additional activities that unspecialised commercial banks are unable to 
perform such as monitoring and giving helpful business advice to fledgling firms.
6  
The contractual arrangement between the innovative entrepreneur and the venture capitalist 
often depends on the ability of the venture capitalist to replace the entrepreneur and run the 
innovative project in case the entrepreneur himself turns out to be incapable or unwilling to 
do a good job. In sum, highly developed and well-functioning venture capital markets might 
be a key element in the Anglo-Saxon institutional setting in financial markets, which 
contributed in the 1990s and into the new millennium to producing a better labour market 
performance in comparison to countries that rely largely on bank financing and on internal 
financing in large established firms. The German attempt to mimic the Anglo-Saxon financial 
market model at least partially via establishing the “Neuer Markt” for initial public offerings 
of young high-tech firms, which have typically been financed by venture capitalists, has 
recently failed spectacularly. If venture capital financing turns out to be empirically important 
for improving labour market performance, public policy must therefore step up efforts to 
reform financial market institutions so that a viable and flourishing venture capital market 
develops in order to contribute not only directly via hard-nosed and politically controversial 
structural reforms of the labour market and of the welfare state to improving labour market 
performance, but also indirectly via the institutional setting in financial markets.  
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 briefly presents a highly stylised 
macroeconomic model that depicts the negative employment effects of matching frictions on 
both the labour and the financial market. This is done under the heuristic assumption that a 
fully developed venture capital market reduces matching frictions in the financial market. 
Section 3 is the core of the paper as it presents new panel data empirical evidence for the 
OECD countries concerning the relationship between venture capital investment and 
employment performance at the macro level. Section 4 offers policy conclusions.  
 
                                                 
6 See Botazzi & Da Rin (2001) and Fehn (2002). 4 | BELKE, FEHN & FOSTER 
2.  Matching Problems and Labour Market Tightness 
The lack of a well-functioning venture capital market represents a type of financial market 
imperfection. There exists a number of ways to model the spill-over effect of incomplete 
financial markets on labour market performance. One such approach would be to consider 
appropriation problems in labour as well as in financial markets that lower the quasi-
equilibrium employment rate.
7 A second possibility is the assumption that malfunctioning 
venture capital markets raise start-up costs for new firms due to greater difficulties in 
obtaining finance, which in turn leads to less entrepreneurship, a lower equilibrium number of 
firms and a lower degree of competition in the goods market. All these effects taken together 
result in a long-run equilibrium that features lower labour market tightness as measured by the 
ratio of the vacancy rate to the unemployment rate and a lower quasi-equilibrium rate of 
employment. Hence, if underdeveloped venture capital markets raise start-up costs for new 
firms, labour market performance unequivocally deteriorates in the long run.
8  
A third approach consists of combining matching problems in labour and financial markets in 
a macro-model assuming that a well-functioning venture capital market is conducive to 
reducing matching problems between firms and financiers, thus increasing labour market 
tightness and raising the quasi-equilibrium rate of employment. The essential building blocks 
of such a model are presented below.
9 There are three types of actors in the model: 
Entrepreneurs with innovative ideas, financiers with capital, and workers. One individual of 
each group is necessary for setting up a firm. There are symmetric matching problems in the 
labour and the financial markets. Firms and banks have difficulty in finding each other just as 
workers and firms do. In order to produce, however, entrepreneurs need both a worker and a 
financier so that both matching problems need to be resolved before any production can start. 
Starting with the labour market, entrepreneurs need to expend search costs γ per period to 
recruit and hire a worker. A simple constant returns to scale matching function  ) , ( V U h  is 
assumed with two inputs, the number of unemployed U and of vacancies V, which are offered 
by all firms in the economy producing a flow of job matches:
10 
 
). ( ) 1 , (
) , ( 1 θ θ q h
V
V U h
≡ =
−      (1) 
A tighter labour market, that is, a higher value of  U V / ≡ θ , lowers the probability q that a 
firm finds a suitable worker:  0 ) ( ' < θ q . 
Hence, in order to find a worker, a firm needs to obtain finance and to look for a financier or 
bank. It is assumed that there are symmetric matching problems also in the financial market. 
There are F firms and B banks and each of these F firms has to spend c search costs per 
period to look for a bank. The flow of financial contracts is given by the matching function 
) , ( F B m . The difficulty of firms to find a suitable bank is represented by the ratio  B F / = φ . 
The inverse 
1 − φ  is therefore a measure for the liquidity of the financial market. The 
probability that a firm encounters a suitable bank is defined as follows: 
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9 This material is entirely based on the pioneering work of Wasmer & Weil (2000) and merely serves to lay a 
theoretical foundation for our own empirical analysis.   
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) ( ) 1 , (
) , ( 1 φ φ p m
F
F B m
≡ =
− , (2) 
with the probability that a bank finds a firm being: 
 
) ( ) , 1 (
) , (
φ φ φ p m
B
F B m
≡ = . (3) 
The first probability depends negatively and the second one positively on financial market 
tightness φ . 
The life of a firm can be separated into four consecutive periods of stochastic length:  
•  Fundraising. Potential entrepreneurs with ideas look in period 0 for banks to set up a firm 
expending a non-pecuniary flow search cost c. Conversely, banks search for suitable firms 
paying a flow search cost k. The probability of a match and thus that a firm moves on to 
the recruitment phase is given by  ) (φ p . 
•  Recruitment. Firms look in period 1 for workers expending a flow search cost γ that is 
financed by the bank met in the fundraising phase. The probability that a firm finds a 
suitable worker is given by  ) (θ q .  
•  Production. Firms produce in period 2 with the aid of the worker hired in the recruitment 
phase that yields a flow revenue y. These cash flows are used to pay workers a given wage 
ω and banks the ex ante agreed-upon price for capital ρ per period in the production 
phase.  
•  Destruction. Firms stop their productive activities with an exogenously given probability s 
and transit into period 3 in which they are dissolved. 
The financial contract between the firm and the bank has two components: the bank provides 
the firm during the recruitment phase 1 with γ money units per time period and the firm pays 
to the bank ρ monetary units per time period during the production phase 2. Total payments in 
both directions are therefore stochastic and the financial contract resembles a profit-sharing or 
venture capital contract because the size of the payments from the firm to the bank during the 
production phase depends on profits and is not fixed. It is assumed that the firm and the bank 
divide the production surplus according to a Nash bargaining solution and that there is free 
entry of firms and banks into the goods and into the financial market, respectively. Hence, 
there are no unused profit opportunities and expected search costs for banks and firms must 
equal expected profits in case of a successfully concluded contract. 
This implies that the value of a matched bank is lower and that one of a matched firm is 
higher in a less liquid financial market with a higher φ , that is, a high equilibrium number of 
firms relative to banks. Banks have to search less and firms more under such circumstances 
with many firms relative to banks. The equilibrium tightness of the financial market rises with 
greater search costs for firms k, whereas it depends negatively on search costs c for banks. A 
higher relative bargaining power of banks relative to firms exerts a negative impact on the 
equilibrium tightness of the financial market, whereas labour market tightness θ , that is, the 
equilibrium vacancy rate relative to the unemployment rate, does not affect the equilibrium in 
the financial market.  6 | BELKE, FEHN & FOSTER 
The graphic solution of the model in a diagram with labour and financial market tightness on 
the horizontal and vertical axis respectively is straightforward and highly intuitive.
11 Let BB 
and FF be the entry or zero profit condition for banks and firms respectively. The entry 
condition for banks or financiers BB must have a positive slope because a higher number of 
firms relative to banks increases the profit opportunities for banks. In order for the zero profit 
condition to be fulfilled, this must be balanced by a higher vacancy rate relative to the 
unemployment rate which reduces profit opportunities for firms and via the profit-sharing 
contract also for banks. In contrast, the entry condition for firms must have a negative slope 
because a tighter labour market, that is, a greater vacancy rate relative to the unemployment 
rate, reduces profit opportunities for firms and must thus be counterbalanced by a more liquid 
financial market, that is, a smaller number of firms relative to banks in order for the zero 
profit condition to hold. Total equilibrium is given by the intersection of both curves at the 
point E with equilibrium financial market tightness being 
* φ  and equilibrium labour market 
tightness being 
* θ .  
Figure 1. Total equilibrium 
FF
E
BB
θ=V/U θ θ
∗
φ
∗
φ=F/B
 
Source: Wasmer & Weil (2000, p. 16). 
Higher search costs for banks would shift the BB curve to the north-west without affecting the 
FF curve thus worsening labour market performance and reducing the liquidity on the 
financial market. Lower search costs for firms for finding a suitable bank would turn the FF 
curve clockwise around the given intersection point with the x-axis thus improving labour 
market performance and reducing the liquidity in the financial market. Higher profits of firms, 
due for example to structural reforms of the labour market, would shift both curves to the east 
thus greatly improving labour market performance, but leaving the liquidity of the financial 
market in the end unchanged.  
The financial market would work perfectly well if neither banks nor firms had to incur search 
costs in the financial market, that is, for  0 = k  and  0 = c . The transition probability for firms 
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in the recruitment phase  ) (φ p  would then be equal to one. There would be no financial 
market restriction in this case and the equilibrium tightness of the financial market would then 
be  0
* = φ . This corresponds with an equilibrium labour market tightness θ  which is 
unequivocally greater than with the financial market restriction:  * θ θ < . Hence, the 
equilibrium vacancy rate relative to the unemployment rate is reduced by adding financial 
market frictions to labour market imperfections. Theory therefore predicts unequivocally that 
a malfunctioning financial or venture capital market with greater matching frictions reduces 
the quasi-equilibrium employment rate and output, whereas it raises the quasi-equilibrium 
unemployment rate. Thus, there should be a positive relationship between labour market 
performance and the development of the venture capital market, as measured by venture 
capital investments relative to GDP for example. 
This result can be directly transferred to the well-known Beveridge curve representation with 
the unemployment rate and the vacancy rate on the horizontal and vertical axis respectively. 
The distance of the Beveridge curve from the origin corresponds positively with matching 
problems on the labour market so that the locus of the Beveridge curve is given if labour 
market frictions are held constant. Adding financial market imperfections to labour market 
frictions is equivalent to moving southeast along a given Beveridge curve toward less 
vacancies and a higher unemployment rate from a point such as P to a point such as W. 
Figure 2. Beveridge curve and incomplete financial market 
Beveridge Curve
W
P
1 u
θ
θ
∗
V
 
Source: Wasmer & Weil (2000, p. 18). 
Due to  * θ θ < , the ray through the origin with financial market imperfections has a smaller 
slope than the one with a perfect financial market, thus yielding clearly a higher quasi-
equilibrium unemployment rate under the assumption of unchanged matching frictions on the 
labour market and thus with a given locus of the Beveridge curve. Hence, if a well-
functioning venture capital market is indeed conducive to reducing matching frictions on the 
financial market, the model clearly predicts that a highly developed venture capital market 
should be correlated with better labour market performance across countries and over time.  8 | BELKE, FEHN & FOSTER 
3. Empirical  Estimation 
3.1 Model and Estimation Procedure 
In this section we estimate the impact of variables measuring venture capital investment on 
employment growth based on the assumption that a well-functioning venture capital market is 
mainly conducive to job creation in new and innovative firms and in integrating young people 
quickly into the regular labour market. It might thus accelerate the process of structural 
change because venture capital investment is unlikely to be of much help in preserving jobs in 
old and declining industries which are at risk of disappearing. Hence, venture capital 
investment can be expected to have a more significant effect on employment growth than on 
official unemployment rates. 
The model is estimated using panel data on a sample of 20 OECD countries over the period 
1986-99.
12 The data and its sources are described in Table 1. 
Table 1. Description of the labour market and capital market variables 
Macroeconomic time series 
Total employment 
(EMP) 
Civilian or (if not available) total economy employment (employees and self 
employed). Source: OECD Main Economic Indicators. 
Real gross domestic product 
(GDP) 
Source: OECD Main Economic Indicators 
Institutional labour market variables 
Benefit replacement ratio 
(RR1) 
Average replacement rate over the first year of an unemployment spell. 
Source: Blanchard & Wolfers (1999, pp. 11 ff. and data appendix). Three 
realisations per country (for 1986-89, 1990-94 and 1995-99). Indicator 
displays more variability than RRATE. 
Benefit duration 
(BENEFIT) 
Duration of unemployment benefits (years, 4 years meaning indefinite). 
Sources: Layard & Nickell (1997, pp. 11 ff.) and complementary data 
delivered by S. Nickell. 
Union coordination index 
(UNCORD) 
Union coordination in wage bargaining. Index with 3 = high, 2 = middle, 1 = 
low. Sources: Layard & Nickell (1997, Table 3) and complementary data 
delivered by S. Nickell. 
Union coverage index 
(UNION) 
Index, 3 = over 70% covered, 2 = 25-70% covered, 3 = under 25% covered. 
Source: Layard & Nickell (1997, Table 3) and complementary data delivered 
by S. Nickell. 
Employment protection index 
(EMPRO) 
Country ranking with 20 as the most strictly regulated. Sources: Layard & 
Nickell (1997, p. 6, Table 2) and complementary data delivered by S. Nickell. 
Tax wedge 
(WEDGE)) 
Total tax wedge (in %). Sum of the payroll tax rate, the income tax rate and 
the consumption tax rate. Average rates derived from national income and tax 
data. Sources: Layard & Nickell (1997, p. 4, Table 1) and complementary data 
delivered by S. Nickell. 
Venture capital investment time series 
Venture capital investment 
(VC) 
Seed, startup and expansion (both government and private sector funded) as 
per mil of average GDP. Sources: Own calculations based on Asian Venture 
Capital Journal (2000), Baygan & Freudenberg (2000), European Venture 
Capital Association (2000), National Venture Capital Association (2000), 
Jeng & Wells (2000). 
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Early stage venture capital 
investment 
(INVEARLY) 
Seed and startup (both government and private sector funded) as per mil of 
average GDP. Sources: Own calculations based on Asian Venture Capital 
Journal (2000), Baygan & Freudenberg (2000), European Venture Capital 
Association (2000), National Venture Capital Association (2000), Jeng & 
Wells (2000) 
Institutional capital market variables 
Creditor rights 
(CREDITRIGHT) 
Index of the legal system’s protection of creditors in case of a firm’s 
liquidation or reorganisation. Range: 0 to 4, 4 is the highest level of creditor 
protection. Source: La Porta et al. (1998), p. 1136, Table 4. 
 
We begin our analysis with the following equation: 
  , ln ln it jit j it it it X GDP VC EMP ε δ β α + + + =       ( 4 )  
where EMP is an index of employment for country i in period t, VCit is our measure of 
venture capital for country i in period t, GDP is the level of real gross domestic product for 
country i in period t, included as a cyclical control variable following Wasmer and Weil 
(2000) and Xjit is a vector of j additional variables used to control for key institutional 
variables.  
The above model is a standard static panel model. In the case of labour market variables as in 
many other economic situations, there are reasons to believe that such a model may be 
dynamically mis-specified. As such, we specify a second estimating equation:  
   , ln ln ln 1 it jit j it it t it X GDP VC EMP EMP ε δ β α γ + + + + = −     (5)   
where  EMPt-1 are lags of the dependent variable. This has the appeal that it models 
employment in a dynamic context, which allows venture capital to have both a short-run and a 
long-run impact.  
Dynamic panel models such as that in equation 5 are characterised by the presence of a lagged 
dependent variable, which creates a number of econometric issues. The major problem that 
arises when introducing a lagged dependent variable as an explanatory variable is that the 
error term and the lagged dependent variable are correlated, with the lagged dependent 
variable being correlated with the individual specific effects that are subsumed into the error 
term. This implies that standard estimators are biased, and as such an alternative method of 
estimating such models is required.  
A now standard procedure to provide consistent estimates is to adopt an instrumental variable 
procedure, which instruments the lagged dependent variable. Although a number of 
candidates are possible, the Arellano and Bond (1991) approach is adopted as this will 
generate the most efficient estimates. The validity of this approach requires a lack of second-
order serial correlation in the dynamic specification, so tests for this are presented with the 
results. Overall instrument validity is also examined using a Sargan test
13 of over-identifying 
restrictions. The null hypothesis of the Sargan test is of the exogeneity of the instrument set.  
We consider a similar specification for both the static and dynamic model. Given the above 
discussion, therefore, the final estimating equations we employ are:  
   , ln it jit j it it it D X DGDP DVC EMP D ε δ β α + + + =      (6)   
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and 
   , ln ln ln 1 it jit j it it t it D X GDP D DVC EMP D EMP D ε δ β α γ + + + + = −    (7)  
where D refers to the first difference of the variable in question. By taking first differences 
from most of our variables, we consider a consistent specification in both the dynamic and 
static models. We estimate therefore the impact on the (approximate) growth of employment 
of the change in venture capital,
14 the change in GDP and of additional labour market 
institution variables. One thing to note from these equations, however, is that the additional 
variables accounting for institutional variables are included in levels rather than differences; 
these are included in levels since they show little variation across time.  
We sequentially use two measures of venture capital, these being either the change in venture 
capital (DVC) or the change in early stage venture capital (DINVEARLY). DVC is defined as 
the seed, start-up and expansion (both government and private sector funded) as per million of 
average GDP, while DINVEARLY is used to account for early stage venture capital only, and 
is defined as the seed and start-up (both government and private sector funded) as per million 
of average GDP. There is good reason to believe that these variables measuring venture 
capital may be endogenous. This is not only valid with respect to the labour market variables 
but also to another independent variable, namely real GDP, which is used as a cyclical control 
variable in our context. Hence, in the case of a significant coefficient of venture capital, one 
could argue that the demand for finance has been strong and the supply of venture capital 
supply has been stimulated in those countries that have been innovative and able to create 
jobs (strong employment growth) and where the macroeconomic climate has been favourable 
and macroeconomic policy has been supportive.
15 In this case, both employment and venture 
capital investment may then be driven by a third factor. Estimated coefficients of venture 
capital might then be biased, although we will show later on in section 3.2 that the correlation 
coefficient between the change in VC investment and the change in real GDP is surprisingly 
low. Hence, to account for the problem of endogeneity of the venture capital variable and thus 
for possible reverse causality we instrument the venture capital variables, employing the 
second lag of the venture capital variables as instruments.  
The additional variables in the model are included to control for key institutional 
characteristics. Firstly, we include variables to control for various institutional labour market 
variables. As such, we include a measure of the benefit replacement ratio (RR1), a measure of 
the duration of unemployment benefits (Benefit), a measure of employment protection 
(Empro), the tax wedge (Wedge), the union coverage index (Union) and a measure of the 
centralisation of wage bargaining (Uncord). It is expected that these will adequately control 
for factors that contribute towards labour market rigidities, which include high firing costs, 
strong unions and generous employment benefits. Secondly, we include a variable to account 
for the presence of institutional capital markets, by including an index of the legal system’s 
protection of creditors in case of a firm’s liquidation or re-organisation (CreditRight). This 
variable reflects the legal position of creditors vis-à-vis firms in case of financial distress. 
                                                 
14 We also included in various specifications the change in the log of venture capital. This resulted in positive 
coefficients, but the results were not as strong, in that the coefficients were not always significant. Similarly, we 
also included in various specifications GDP growth (i.e. the change in the log of GDP) as opposed to simply the 
change in GDP. This didn’t affect the results a great deal, although in a small number of cases GDP growth was 
not significant where the change in GDP was. These results are available on request. 
15 Given that labour market institutions are often badly measured, an alternative view would be that venture 
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With respect to the sign on the coefficients of these additional variables included in our 
regressions, we expect the following marginal coefficients for the employment equations.
16 
We expect RR1, Benefit, Empro, Wedge and Union to be negative, while the coefficients on 
Uncord and CreditRight are expected to exert a positive impact on employment growth. At 
the same time we expect that the coefficients on the changes in the two venture capital 
variables (DVC and DINVEARLY) would be positive so that more venture capital investment 
would raise employment growth.  
3.2 Results 
We began our formal empirical analysis with tests of the non-stationarity of the variables under 
consideration. The test we applied was the widely used panel data unit root test by Levin and 
Lin (2002).
17 This test represents a direct extension of the univariate ADF test setting to panel 
data. The results by Levin and Lin indicate that panel data are particularly useful for 
distinguishing between unit roots and highly persistent stationarity in macroeconomic data 
and that their unit root test for panel data is appropriate in panels of moderate size (between 
10 and 250 cross-sections) as encountered in our study.  
Tables 2a and 2b display the results of applying this unit root test to our set of variables. 
Table 2a refers to tests on the levels of the variables and Table 2b to tests applied to the first 
differences. As usual, we difference the variables until they are stationary. Hence, we will 
follow a consistent approach in our estimations and only use a set of stationary variables. 
Table 2a. Panel ADF-test statistics for levels of variables 
Variable  t-value  
(no lagged differences) 
t-value  
(one lagged difference) 
t-value  
(two lagged differences) 
I) ADF-test statistic (no constant, no trend) 
lnEMP +7.48  +3.45  +3.41 
GDP +17.82  +6.86  +6.05 
VC -2.22**  +2.47  +3.46 
INVEARLY -1.55*  -0.48  +5.68 
II) ADF-test statistic (common constant, no trend) 
lnEMP -3.91***  -4.93***  -4.99*** 
GDP 0.35  -1.18  -0.65 
VC -4.22***  +0.02  +1.08 
INVEARLY -3.06***  -2.19**  +4.09 
III) ADF-test statistic (common constant and trend) 
lnEMP -5.03***  -6.21***  -6.49*** 
GDP -3.27***  -5.14***  -5.68*** 
VC +0.23  +0.44  +1.12 
INVEARLY +3.61  +3.83  +4.84 
IV) ADF-test statistic (individual-specific constant and trend) 
lnEMP -2.33 -5.65 -5.08 
GDP -0.81  -3.55  -3.39 
VC -1.24  -0.78  +0.54 
INVEARLY +2.27  +2.68  -4.37 
                                                 
16 See, for example, Blanchard & Wolfers (1999), and Layard & Nickell (1997). 
17 This test was augmented by Levin & Lin (1993) and critically surveyed by Higgins & Zakrajsek (1999). 12 | BELKE, FEHN & FOSTER 
Notes: The t-value is the realisation of the usual ADF-test statistic; */**/*** denotes significance of the lagged endogenous 
variable; the sample range is 1986-99 with adjustments if necessary due to the lag structure. 
Ad I) Test equations correspond to model 1 in Levin and Lin (1992). The relevant critical values are -1.39/-1.76/ 
-2.45 (Levin & Lin, 1992, Table 1, p. 45) (for N=20 cross-sections and t=10 periods). 
Ad II) Test equations correspond to model 2 in Levin and Lin (1992). The relevant critical values are -1.57/ 
-1.94/-2.64 (Levin & Lin, 1992, Table 2, p. 46) (for N=20 cross-sections and t=10 periods). 
Ad III) Test equations correspond to model 3 in Levin and Lin (1992). The relevant critical values are -1.75/ 
-2.13/-2.85 (Levin & Lin, 1992, Table 3, p. 47) (for N=20 cross-sections and t=10 periods). 
Ad IV) Test equations correspond to model 5 in Levin and Lin (1992). The relevant critical values are -6.82/ 
-7.06/-7.51 (Levin & Lin, 1992, Table 5, p. 49) (for N=20 cross-sections and t=10 periods). 
 
Table 2b. Panel ADF-test statistics for first differences of variables 
Variable  t-value  
(no lagged differences) 
t-value  
(one lagged difference) 
t-value  
(two lagged differences) 
I) ADF-test statistic (no constant, no trend) 
DlnEMP -6.96*** -6.98*** -6.37*** 
DGDP -5.37***  -4.45***  -3.38*** 
DVC -17.32***  -6.88***  -3.68*** 
DINVEARLY -14.11***  -12.68***  -3.36*** 
II) ADF-test statistic (common constant, no trend) 
DlnEMP -7.93*** -7.95*** -7.32*** 
DGDP -9.27***  -7.88***  -6.71*** 
DVC -18.04***  -7.75***  -4.67*** 
DINVEARLY -14.50***  -13.64***  -4.32*** 
III) ADF-test statistic (common constant and trend) 
DlnEMP -8.06*** -8.10*** -7.60*** 
DGDP -9.44***  -8.28***  -7.27*** 
DVC -11.67***  -6.30***  -3.48*** 
DINVEARLY -8.79***  -5.33***  -0.56 
IV) ADF-test statistic (individual-specific constant and trend) 
DlnEMP -8.52*** -9.10*** -9.08*** 
DGDP -10.39***  -9.87***  -9.44*** 
DVC -11.73***  -6.48 -3.74 
DINVEARLY -9.51***  -6.48  -1.55 
Note: The t-value is the realisation of the usual ADF-test statistic; */**/*** denotes significance of the lagged endogenous 
variable; the sample range is 1986-99 with adjustments if necessary due to the lag structure. 
Ad I) Test equations correspond to model 1 in Levin and Lin (1992). The relevant critical values are -1.39/-1.76/ 
-2.45 (Levin & Lin, 1992, Table 1, p. 45) (for N=20 cross-sections and t=10 periods). 
Ad II) Test equations correspond to model 2 in Levin and Lin (1992). The relevant critical values are -1.57/ 
-1.94/-2.64 (Levin & Lin, 1992, Table 2, p. 46) (for N=20 cross-sections and t=10 periods). 
Ad III) Test equations correspond to model 3 in Levin and Lin (1992). The relevant critical values are -1.75/ 
-2.13/-2.85 (Levin & Lin, 1992, Table 3, p. 47) (for N=20 cross-sections and t=10 periods). 
Ad IV) Test equations correspond to model 5 in Levin and Lin (1992). The relevant critical values are -6.82/ 
-7.06/-7.51 (Levin & Lin, 1992), Table 5, p. 49) (for N=20 cross-sections and t=10 periods). 
 
The unit root tests reveal not only evidence of non-stationary behaviour of the venture capital 
investment variables, but also identify a kind of explosive evolvement of venture capital 
investment. The latter can be considered as a well-known stylised fact especially of the late 
1990s. It is indicated by high positive empirical realisations of the ADF-test statistics in Table DOES VENTURE CAPITAL INVESTMENT SPUR EMPLOYMENT GROWTH? | 13 
 
2a. Overall, the test results for the levels reveal that the null-hypothesis of non-stationarity has 
to be accepted for most of the variables under consideration. The evidence is borderline in 
only a few specifications of the test equations. However, the ADF-tests for the first 
differenced variables deliver overwhelming evidence of stationarity. Non-stationarity cannot 
be rejected in only 5 out of 48 cases. These exceptions are most probably due to the rather 
high critical values of the test statistics and the relatively small sample size. The latter is of 
course dominated by the exceptionally explosive behaviour of the venture capital series in the 
non-Anglo-Saxon countries over the very last years. 
Based on our theoretical arguments, we conjecture that controlling for the key institutional 
variables on the labour and the capital market, the presence of venture capital improves 
labour-market performance in a cross-country panel analysis. To test for a significant 
relationship between venture capital and labour-market performance, we undertake 
estimations in differences and for early stage as well as for total venture capital investment. 
The models were estimated using the package Dynamic Panel Data 98 for GAUSS, details of 
which are provided by Arellano and Bond (1998). The following tables display the results 
from estimating equations 3 and 4. The tables report the coefficients along with 
heteroscedastic consistent t-ratios. The validity of the dynamic models depends upon a lack of 
second order serial correlation and the validity of the instrument set, tested for with the 
Sargan test. Results of these tests are reported in the tables. 
Table 3. Total venture capital investment and employment growth 
DlnEMP  1 2 3 4 5 6 
DlnEMP-1     0.51 
(9.08)*** 
0.41 
(5.81)*** 
0.43 
(6.02)*** 
DVC 0.03 
(1.95)** 
0.03 
(1.75)* 
0.03 
(0.94) 
0.009 
(3.37)*** 
0.008 
(2.6)*** 
0.006 
(1.87)* 
DGDP   0.005 
(1.41)** 
0.005 
(1.64)* 
 0.005 
(6.39)*** 
0.006 
(5.1)*** 
RR1    -0.0009 
(-0.7) 
  0.0001 
(0.51) 
Benefit    0.003 
(0.32) 
  -0.0002 
(-0.11) 
Uncord    0.03 
(1.14) 
  0.005 
(0.79) 
Empro    0.002 
(0.46) 
  0.001 
(2.03)** 
Wedge    -0.0001 
(-0.11) 
  -0.0001 
(-0.23) 
Credit  Right    -0.01 
(-0.67) 
  0.003 
(1.11) 
Union    -0.03 
(-0.61) 
  -0.02 
(-1.53) 
Constant 0.005 
(1.44) 
-0.006 
(-0.83) 
0.07 
(0.71) 
0.003 
(2.98)*** 
-0.007 
(-4.26)*** 
0.002 
(0.13) 
        
Wald  Test  3.79* 8.24**  14.24 139.8***  118.2***  298.3*** 
Sargan Test  0.45 (df = 10) 
(p = 0.45) 
6.92 (df = 9) 
(p = 0.65) 
0.94 (df=2) 
(p = 0.63) 
96.5** 
(df=75) 
(p = 0.048) 
79.62 (df=74) 
(p = 0.31) 
56.8 (df=67) 
(p = 0.81) 
1
st Order 
Correlation 
2.46** 2.04** 1.4  0.66  -1.05  0.11 
2
nd Order 
Correlation 
2.09**  1.61 1.13 -0.3 -0.38  1.05 14 | BELKE, FEHN & FOSTER 
Note: All models are estimated using robust standard errors. Values in parentheses are t-statistics. ***, **, * indicate 
significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively. For the Sargan test, we report the test statistic alongside the 
number of degrees of freedom (df) and the p-value. The instruments used in the static model are the lags of the change 
in venture capital, while in the dynamic model we have the lags of the change in venture capital and the lags of the 
lagged dependent variable as instruments. 
Table 4. Early stage venture capital investment and employment growth 
DlnEMP  1 2 3 4 5 6 
DlnEMP-1     0.51 
(11.04)*** 
0.41 
(5.16)*** 
0.41 
(4.73)*** 
DINVEARLY 0.01 
(0.59) 
0.04 
(1.91*) 
-0.02 
(-0.27) 
0.02 
(2.44)** 
0.02 
(1.92)* 
0.01 
(1.51) 
DGDP   0.007 
(3.44)*** 
0.01 
(1.46) 
 0.005 
(7.69)*** 
0.006 
(5.87)*** 
RR1    -0.0008 
(-0.48) 
  0.00004 
(0.2) 
Benefit    0.007 
(0.54) 
  0.0002 
(0.1) 
Uncord    -0.01 
(-0.63) 
  0.006 
(0.83) 
Empro    -0.001 
(-0.36) 
  0.001 
(1.82)* 
Wedge    0.002 
(0.78) 
  -0.00003 
(-0.12) 
Credit  Right    -0.00002 
(-0.0008) 
  0.005 
(1.05) 
Union    -0.01 
(-0.21) 
  -0.02 
(-1.67)* 
Constant 0.008 
(3.28)*** 
-0.01 
(-1.9)* 
-0.03 
(-0.21) 
0.003 
(3.02)*** 
-0.007 
(-3.67)*** 
0.004 
(0.18) 
        
Wald  Test  0.35  11.91*** 33.74*** 232.08***  87.4***  264.47*** 
Sargan Test  16.21* 
(df=10) 
(p = 0.09) 
13.26 (df=9) 
(p = 0.15) 
1.1  (df=2) 
1.2  (p = 
0.58) 
100.08** 
(df=75) 
(p = 0.03) 
84.68 (df=74) 
(p = 0.19) 
51.83 (df=67) 
(p = 0.91) 
1
st Order 
Correlation 
2.61***  1.78*  1.35 0.68 -0.97  0.94 
2
nd Order 
Correlation 
2.15**  0.66 1.21 -1.06  -0.65  1.25 
Note: All models are estimated using robust standard errors. Values in parentheses are t-statistics. ***, **, * indicate 
significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively. For the Sargan test, we report the test statistic alongside the 
number of degrees of freedom (df) and the p-value. The instruments used in the static model are the lags of the change 
in venture capital, while in the dynamic model we have the lags of the change in venture capital and the lags of the 
lagged dependent variable as instruments. 
To start with, note that the Sargan test for the validity of the instruments tends to be 
insignificant and that the test of second order serial correlation is insignificant in the dynamic 
model, suggesting that the models are well specified. If we begin by examining the 
coefficients on the additional variables included in the model, we see that the coefficient on 
the change in GDP is positive as expected, and tends to be significant in both tables and in 
both the static and dynamic specification. Hence, the well-known prior that GDP growth is 
one important determinant of employment growth is corroborated by our estimations. 
The coefficients on the institutional variables included in the models tend to be very small and 
in only three cases are they significant. Employment protection is significant in both dynamic 
specifications but with an unexpected positive sign. However, the impact of employment 
protection on labour market performance is highly disputed in theory so that our expectations DOES VENTURE CAPITAL INVESTMENT SPUR EMPLOYMENT GROWTH? | 15 
 
were only borderline in this case. The union coverage index is significant and negative as 
expected in the dynamic case of Table 4. These weak results on the institutional variables are 
likely to reflect a number of concerns with the data on these institutional variables. Firstly, we 
may expect a great deal of multi-collinearity between these variables and the results are 
indicative of such a problem, characterised by insignificant coefficients and coefficients that 
are not of the expected sign. Table 5 reports the correlation matrix and we can see from this 
that the correlations between a number of the institutional variables are reasonably high. This 
is in clear contrast to the empirical realisations of the correlation coefficient between the 
change in VC investment and real GDP growth. They are surprisingly low (0.1 for both DVC 
and DINVEARLY). 
Secondly, the lack of consistent and significant results on these additional variables may 
reflect the fact that they show very little variation over time. These data have been used to 
explain labour market performance in cross-section and panel data studies using averages 
over time and have been found to be significant.
18 Given that our data has a significant time-
series dimension to it, we would expect that the coefficients on these variables would not be 
as significant as in a cross-section regression for example, where only the cross-country and 
not the time-series variation would be important. Although these problems are likely to be 
important, it needs to be kept in mind that these are not the variables of primary interest in 
this paper and that they are included largely as a test of robustness on the variable of interest 
here, namely venture capital.  
Finally, we can concentrate on the variables representing venture capital. Table 3 examines 
the impact of the change in venture capital on the growth of employment. The coefficients on 
DVC are always positive as expected, and they are also significant at least at the 10 percent 
level in five out of the six cases depicted. The dynamic results tend to be more supportive of a 
significant impact of DVC on the growth of employment, in the sense that the coefficients 
tend to be significant at higher levels of significance. At the same time, the coefficients in the 
static model tend to be larger in absolute value.  
Table 4 replaces DVC with DINVEARLY, in order to examine the impact of early stage 
venture capital investment on employment growth. The coefficients on DINVEARLY are not 
quite as supportive of an impact of early stage venture capital investment on employment 
growth possibly reflecting the fact that expansion investment which is not included here 
affects job creation most directly. Although the coefficient is positive as expected in five out 
of six cases, it is now significant in only half of the cases. Once again, the results are more 
supportive in the dynamic case, with more significant coefficients being found, which 
indicates once again that the employment effects of venture capital investment are part of a 
dynamic process.  
A potential caveat raised in section 3.1 was that the estimated coefficients of venture capital 
might be biased due to a reverse causality between real GDP growth and the change in VC 
investment. A short inspection of the correlation coefficients between the change in both 
definitions of VC investments and real GDP growth listed in Table 5 reveals that the 
empirical realisations of the former are in fact surprisingly low. Hence, although we 
accounted for the theoretical problem of endogeneity of the venture capital variable and thus 
for possible reverse causality a priori by instrumenting the venture capital variables, this 
problem does actually not seem to be a problem in our sample. 
                                                 
18 See, for example, Nickell (1997) and Layard & Nickell (1997). | 16 
Table 5. Correlation matrix 
  DEMP DlnEMP  DGDP  DlnGDP  DInvearly DlnInvearly DVC DlnVC RR1  Benefit Uncord Empro  Wedge Credit  Union 
D E M P   1                         
DlnEMP  0.99  1                      
DGDP  0.52  0.51  1                     
DlnGDP  0.47  0.47  0.98  1                    
DInvearly  0.15  0.14  0.1  0.05  1                  
DlnInvearly  0.10  0.1  0.09 0.07 0.5  1                  
DVC 0.16  0.16  0.1  0.07  0.77  0.34 1              
DlnVC  0.1  0.1  0.13 0.13 0.33  0.51  0.62  1              
RR1  -0.07  -0.07  -0.06 -0.05 -0.006  -0.007  -0.005  -0.04 1             
Benefit  0.14  0.14  0.17 0.18 -0.08  0.03  -0.07  -0.04  -0.2  1           
Uncord  -0.17  -0.17  -0.05 -0.05 -0.12  0.01  -0.08  0.02  0.35  -0.02  1      
Empro  -0.13  -0.14 0.03 0.05 -0.12  -0.008  -0.1  0.01 0.11  0.18 0.37 1       
Wedge  -0.26  -0.16  -0.13 -0.12 -0.001  0.04  0.01  0.02 0.35  -0.12  0.51 0.45  1     
Credit  -0.03  -0.03  -0.06 -0.05 -0.11  -0.02  -0.05  0.01 -0.3  0.34 0.51 0.05  -0.004  1   
Union  -0.07  -0.08 0.12 0.13 -0.16  -0.02  -0.14 -0.01  0.34  0.37  0.63  0.7 0.43  0.1 1 
Note: This correlation matrix includes some variables not contained in the final specifications. However, they were used by us in additional robustness estimations that were not included in 
Tables 3 and 4 due to their lower goodness-of-fit. DOES VENTURE CAPITAL INVESTMENT SPUR EMPLOYMENT GROWTH? | 17 
 
3.3 Long-Run Effects 
Based on our dynamic results, it is possible to estimate the long-run contribution of venture 
capital to employment growth, using the formula ∑ ∑ − ), 1 /( i i α β  where βi are the 
coefficients on the venture capital variables and αi are the coefficients on the lagged 
employment growth variable. The long-run effect of venture capital for the results displayed 
in Tables 3-4 is reported in Table 6. 
Table 6. Long run impact of venture capital investment on employment growth 
  Column 4  Column 5  Column 6 
Table 3 (DVC)  0.018  0.014  0.011 
Table 4 (DINVEARLY)  0.041  0.03  0.017 
Note: The table contains the estimated long-run coefficients of the respective VC variable implied by the estimation results 
listed in Tables 3 and 4. 
 
To understand what these results imply we can use an example. If we take the value 0.018 
from the upper left cell of Table 6, this tells us that a one unit increase in venture capital (i.e. 
DVC = 1) will increase employment growth by 1.8 percentage points. Taking the example of 
Germany, which had an average change in VC investment over the period studied of DVC = 
0.15 units and in early VC investment of DINVEARLY= 0.04 units, we can calculate that a 
one standard deviation increase in the change in DVC (accidentally exactly equal to 1.00) 
would have increased employment growth by around 1.8 percentage points according to the 
value 1.8.
19 Moreover, the value of 0.041 in the lower left cell of Table 6 would imply that a 
one standard deviation increase in DINVEARLY (equal to 0.25) would have raised 
employment growth by around 1 percentage point. We can conduct similar exercises for the 
remaining entries in Table 6. Doing so suggests that an increase in DVC by one standard 
deviation would increase employment growth by between 1.1 and 1.4% (last two entries in 
the first row). Similarly an increase in DINVEARLY by one standard deviation would increase 
the change in employment by between 0.43 and 0.75% (last two entries in the second row). It 
should be noted that these figures are strikingly similar for DVC and DINVEARLY. One note 
of caution in interpreting these figures is that we are using at most 13 years of data to try and 
infer the long-run impact of venture capital on employment growth. This might be inadequate, 
but at least the interval of a 1.0 to a 1.8% employment growth effect of venture capital that is 
identified here may be used as a rough guide. 
The non-negligible size of these effects must be attributed to our conjecture that venture 
capital investment is different from standard types of investment because it is directed 
especially to new and innovative firms. If projects that are funded via venture capital turn out 
to be successful, they therefore tend to have particularly large returns on investment and they 
also tend to have particularly large multiplier effects on output and employment, e.g. by 
prodding technological advancements or by generating a market for a new innovative product. 
The total real effect of successful venture capital investment is therefore not at all restricted to 
the firm directly concerned but spill-over and trickle-down effects to other firms also matter. 
                                                 
19 The high empirical realisation of the standard deviation is due to the explosive development of the venture 
capital investment time series. The latter became obvious already in the panel unit root tests by the high positive 
numbers of the ADF-test statistics for the levels of these variables (see Tables 2a and 2b). 18 | BELKE, FEHN & FOSTER 
4. Conclusions 
Many economists argue that labour market rigidities and generous welfare states are at the 
core of persistently low job creation in continental Europe compared to most Anglo-Saxon 
countries and especially compared to the US in the 1990s. It is important to note, however, 
that job creation might in addition depend on markets that are complementary to the labour 
market and whose malfunctioning might also constitute a bottleneck for job creation. Such a 
bottleneck might be the possibility for young and innovative firms to obtain finance for their 
highly risky projects. Hence, by leaving out capital market variables, past empirical results 
might have overstated the impact and significance of some of the labour market variables. 
The ability of a country to encourage and sustain technological innovation by entrepreneurial 
firms is after all one of the main sources of economic and employment growth.  
Economic intuition suggests that venture capitalists have to play a key role in this respect 
because they have often been able to provide promising companies with adequate risk 
financing, this especially being the case in the US. Economists have so far paid relatively 
little attention to the possibility of a virtuous circle between entrepreneurial dynamism, 
innovative start-ups, a dynamic venture capital industry and job creation.  
It has recently been argued that it is a challenging empirical problem to demonstrate a causal 
relationship between the presence of venture capital investment and innovation or job 
growth.
20 This paper delivers pioneering empirical evidence of such a link at the 
macroeconomic level. We are able to show that venture capital is able to significantly raise 
employment growth and job creation. We conjecture that venture capital is mainly conducive 
to job creation in new and innovative firms and that it facilitates the process of structural 
change towards the new economy. This is of little help, however, in reintegrating the long-
term unemployed into the regular labour market where appropriate reforms of the welfare 
state and of labour market institutions have to play the key role. 
The results obtained are particularly important considering the fact that direct policies to 
combat unemployment, for example, by deregulating the labour market or by trimming 
welfare state activities, are notoriously difficult to implement in the political decision process, 
so that indirect alternative routes such as via fostering the venture capital market and thus 
entrepreneurial dynamism are urgently called for in continental Europe.  
Nevertheless, these results should not be misinterpreted as a justification for government 
subsidies to the venture capital industry or for government-run venture capital activities. 
Rather, the government should provide an institutional framework that is favourable to the 
development of a flourishing private venture capital industry and entrepreneurial dynamism. 
There exists a number of possible ways of doing so. First, the pension system could be 
capitalized to a greater extent and pension funds could be allowed to invest part of their assets 
in venture capital firms. Based on the US example, this should further spur the development 
of the venture capital market in continental Europe.
21 Second, a well-functioning market for 
initial public offerings such as NSDAQ needs to be created as an exit route for venture 
capitalists. This is especially important since European attempts at doing so such as the 
“Neuer Markt” have recently failed spectacularly. Trust and transparency are clearly key 
issues in recreating such an exit market so that there is especially a need for strong and 
unequivocal corporate governance and accounting rules.  
                                                 
20 See Gompers & Lerner (2001, p. 164). 
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However, it is also important to keep in mind in this respect that it is not at all only the supply 
of venture capital that might restrict the total volume of venture capital investment, but 
possibly also the lack of suitable entrepreneurs with innovative ideas as well as the lack of 
incentives to undertake risky ventures and to disclose innovative ideas to possible financiers. 
With respect to the last point, a third possible policy to foster venture capital markets is 
therefore the implementation of stronger patent rights along the lines found in the US. This 
might be conducive to fostering venture capital markets because innovative entrepreneurs 
might then be less afraid to disclose their ideas to a venture capitalist for fear that they would 
be taken advantage of. 
Fourth, the education system, especially at university level, along with an elaborate 
institutional framework for transforming innovative ideas into new business ventures would 
be the primary levers to address such a scarcity of able human resources. Fifth, the tax system 
should provide adequate incentives for entrepreneurs to take risks rather than having the 
government participate only via highly progressive taxes in the upside of ventures. A highly 
progressive tax system, high taxation of capital gains, taxes on assets of firms along with 
strict limitations on rolling over losses, which are almost inevitable in the start-up phase of 
new ventures, into future periods are important factors stifling entrepreneurial dynamism and 
venture capital investments. 
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